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Chapter 5. Fiscal and monetary policy interaction II: 























































What	 situations	 are	 there	 in	which	neither	 fiscal	nor	monetary	policies	 are	 able	 to	
avoid	a	financial	crisis,	and	how	can	they	be	avoided?








































































Literature modeling the strategic interaction of the authorities 





































Practical applications of the research 
The	creation	of	the	European	Monetary	Union	(EMU)	influenced	researchers	to	con-






























































































we	 construct	 a	 forward-looking	 solution	 that	 is	 determined	 by	 the	 required	 transversality	
conditions.	Some	of	the	results	were	arrived	at	by	using	numerical	methods.



































Fiscal and monetary policy: 











avenues	of	 research	 in	 this	area	 in	 the	economic	 literature.	The	 first	 is	 the	analysis	of	 the	
interaction	between	the	government	and	the	central	bank	in	the	context	of	the	influence	of	






















































7	 In	reality,	 the	practice	of	 indexing	the	public	debt	 is	not	widespread.	However,	 in	Sargent’s	opinion	


















the	financing	of	the	operational	deficit	of	the	budget:	 d + rb = &b+ S ,	or
	 &b = rb + d − S .	 (2.1)








	 b(t) = b
0
ert + d(τ)− S(τ)⎡⎣ ⎤⎦e






























10	 Equation	 (2.1),	obviously,	defines	many	possible	 trajectories	of	 the	public	debt.	 In	a	dynamic	eco-
nomics	there	are	two	methods	to	choose	a	concrete	trajectory	(particular	solutions	of	the	dynamic	equation):	








a	 basis	 for	 formulating	macroeconomic	 policy	 without	 additional	 comments.	We	 suggest	
three	approaches	to	the	solution	of	this	problem.	















= r − g
y( )by + dy − Sy.	 (2.4)
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Sustainable macroeconomic policies 
The	constraint	(2.6)	does	imply	that	the	volume	of	public	debt	remains	stable,	but	“re-




































lace,	 is	 based	on	 the	 assumption	 that	 economic	 agents	 are	 rational.	Their	 actions,	which	
determine	 the	current	state	and	 the	dynamics	of	 the	economic	system,	are	based	on	 their	
expectations	concerning	future	states	of	the	system.	Formally,	one	assumes	that	(i)	the	expec-
tations	of	economic	agents	are	rational;	(ii)	it	is	necessary	to	use	conditions	about	the	future	













ward-looking	specification	of	 the	dynamics	of	public	debt	 should	not	be	considered	 to	be	




















post factum	by	any	means,	while	(2.7)	can	be	rewritten	 in	terms	of	 future	macroeconomic	
policy;	the	determination	of	this	policy	is	what	we	wish	to	achieve.	Indeed,	the	general	solu-
tion	of	(2.1)	can	be	written	as
	 b(t) = Cbe
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2.3. Monetary policy and inflation
One	of	the	most	popular	models	of	inflation	dynamics	is	the	Cagan	model.	Originally,	
Cagan	(1956)	considered	 the	dynamics	of	 the	money	market,	assuming	adaptive	 inflation	

































	 x = −απe .	 (2.12)

































= µ − π(t).	 (2.13)
Let	us	first	consider	the	hypothesis	of	adaptive	expectations,	in	accordance	with	which	
the	dynamics	of	 the	expected	 rate	of	 inflation,	and	 therefore	of	 the	 real	money	balances,	
will	be	backward-looking.	Economic	agents	have	a	systematic	forecast	error	and	adapt	their	
expectations	with	speed	θ:
	 &πe(t) = θ π(t)− πe(t)( ), θ > 0 .	 (2.14)
Taken	together,	(2.12),	(2.13)	and	(2.14)	determine	the	dynamics	of	inflation:
	 &π(t) = θ
1−αθ
µ − π(t)( ).	 (2.15)
For	an	initial	level	of	inflation	that	is	different	from	the	(say,	constant)	growth	rate	of	base	
money,	the	backward-looking	solution	is












	 πe (t) = π(t).	 (2.17)







	 &π(t) = − 1α
µ(t)− π(t)( ).	 (2.18)
The	general	solution	of	this	dynamics	equation	for	a	variable	(in	the	general	case)	growth	rate	
of	base	money	can	be	written	as:
	 π(t) = Cπe
1
α


















































x +µ .	 (2.23)
The	backward-looking	solution	of	equation	(2.23)	for	the	initial	condition	 x 0( ) = x0 = −απ0	
and	a	constant	growth	rate	of	base	money	has	a	form	that	is	analogous	to	equation	(2.20):
	 x(t) = x* + (x0 − x * )e
1
α t ,	 (2.24)
where	 x* = −αµ 	is	the	stationary	log-level	of	real	money	balances.	
19





































	 −π(t) = −µ + −π
0
































































































































termined)	 trajectory	of	 the	primary	budget	deficit,	 the	 less	 the	volume	of	 seigniorage,	 the	
higher	the	public	debt	at	all	points	 in	time	in	the	future.	Indeed,	by	compensating	for	the	



















a	higher	growth	 rate	of	base	money	 (inflation)	 in	 the	 future.	 If,	however,	 the	demand	 for	





























































































as percent  
of GDP
Seigniorage  





as percent  
of GDP
Seigniorage 
as percent  
of government 
spending
Denmark 0.3943 1.0512 Thailand 1.0872 6.3018
United States 0.4295 1.9552 Philippines 1.2251 8.9611
Canada 0.4371 2.0144 Indonesia 1.3908 6.8590
United Kingdom 0.4373 1.2800 Korea 1.5690 9.6979
Belgium 0.4910 1.0187 Malaysia 1.5749 5.2696
Netherlands 0.5352 1.0184 Spain 2.0267 7.5584
France 0.5520 1.3863 Colombia 2.3178 17.5651
Norway 0.5630 1.4598 Italy 2.3572 7.4229
Finland 0.5966 2.1217 Brazil 3.0394 13.7132
Switzerland 0.6187 6.7397 Greece 3.1291 10.5149
Germany 0.6869 2.3539 Mexico 3.7207 18.9687
Austria 0.6940 1.8944 Argentina 9.7299 62.0003
Sweden 0.7234 1.9301 Chile 10.3001 32.5765
Japan 0.9585 5.6200 Israel 14.8424 22.2781
Source:	Click,	1998	(extract	from	Table	1,	p.	155).








King	and	Plosser	 (1985)	 found	 that	past	deficits	do	predict	 seigniorage.	However,	 they	also	














The	 final	question	of	 the	 inflationary	consequences	of	 seigniorage	 raises	 little	doubts.	














Moreover,	 if	 the	analysis	 in	 this	work	 in	certain	aspects	uses	“traditional”	monetary	 logic	
in	constructing	models,	it	would	be	unfair	to	pass	by	a	new,	interesting	(if	not	generally	ac-
cepted)	theory	and	its	logic	in	determining	macroeconomic	policies.















































the	decisions	of	economic	agents	must	satisfy	the	budget	constraint	for any price level.	Thus,	





















Government bonds as stocks: an asset pricing interpretation 
 In	the	modern	world,	money	issued	by	the	state	is	not	explicitly backed	(“fiat”	or	“un-
backed”	money).	 In	 accordance	with	 traditional	monetarist	 theory,	 the	 positive	worth	 of	















































The wealth effect as a mechanism by which fiscal policy influences the price level
Again,	 as	 in	 the	 case	 of	 the	 monetary	 approach	 (the	 quantitative	 theory),	 in	 which	
the	logic	of	determining	the	price	level	based	on	the	exchange	equation	MV	=	Py	does	not	
























determination,	except through its consequences for the government’s budget”.







































50	 In	 the	 terminology	of	McCallum,	 this	problem	is	 that	of	nominal	 indeterminacy.	 In	his	critique	of	
FTPL,	McCallum	(2001)	notes	 that	 in	many	cases	 the	new	 theory	deals	not	with	 the	problem	of	nominal	
indeterminacy,	but	with	 the	problem	of	multiple	equilibria	 (solution	multiplicity	or	nonuniqueness)	 in	 the	
determination	of	the	trajectory	of	the	price	level.
31






















































equilibrium	price	 level	 is	determined	 (in	 line	with	 the	monetarist	paradigm)	by	monetary	
policies,	i.e.	based	on	the	exchange	equation.	As	an	illustration	of	an	MD	policy,	Woodford	
(1995)	gives	the	following	rule	for	fiscal	policy:
	 T (t) = G(t)− S(t)+ γrb(t), 0 < γ ≤1.	 (2.31)
For	this	fiscal	policy,	the	budget	constraint	of	the	government	(as	an	equation	for	the	dyna-
mics	of	the	public	debt)	reduces	to	the	equation:








































Cochrane	 (1999)	 notes	 an	 important	 difference	 between	 FD	 and	MD	 policies	 from	
a	 dynamic	 point	 of	 view.	The	FD-type	 (FTPL)	 considers	 in	 essence	 the	 forward-looking	
dynamics	of	the	public	debt:	its	real	value	is	determined	by	future	fiscal	policy,	and	the	equi-
















































































































ral)	assumptions,	 the	price	 level	 is	not	explosive,	but	rather	approaches	zero.	This	 is	what	














luation equation.	Buiter	 (1998,	1999)	 insists	 that	 the	 interpretation	of	 (2.29)	as	a	budget	
constraint	 (for	 any	price	 level)	 is	 the	only	one	possible,	 and	a	 refusal	of	 this	 traditional	
interpretation	makes	FTPL	internally	inconsistent.	Cochrane	insists	no	less	forcibly	that	
there	is	another	interpretation:	“…There	are	three	steps	in	defining	a	competitive	Walrasian	










tion).	McCallum	 insists	 on	 the	necessity	 of	 considering	 two	 separate	 conditions,	 since	 the	 situation	when	
b(t)→−∞ 	and	 m(t)→ +∞ 	allows	for	the	possibility	of	infinite	credit	from	the	state	to	the	private	sector	and	
this	obviously	seems	unreal,	and	yet	does	not	contradict	the	transversality	condition	for	b(t)	+	m(t).	Here	this	














































































































Nonlinear dynamics of inflation and public debt
3.1. Introduction





























































3.2. Monetization of the budget deficit:  














Seigniorage	may	be	 further	decomposed	 into	 two	components:	 the	 so-called	pure seignio- 
rage	 &m 	(increase	in	real	money	balances),	and	the	inflation tax	mπ.	Seigniorage	can	also	be	
written	as	µm,	the	product	of	the	growth	rate	of	base	money	and	real	money	balances.	Using	
(3.1),	the	government’s	budget	constraint	can	be	written	as6:	




	 &m = rb
0
+ d( )−mπ = D −mπ ,	 (3.3)
where	the	variable	D	is	the	operational	budget	deficit.	If	the	money	market	is	in	a	steady	state,	
when	the	rate	of	inflation	is	equal	to	the	growth	rate	of	base	money	( &m = (µ − π)m = 0, µ = π ),	
the	operational	budget	deficit	is	financed	only	by	the	inflation	tax;	the	former	completely	de-
termines	the	volume	of	seigniorage:




inflation	and	actual	inflation	are	equal,	 πe = π;	this	is	possible	if	adaptive	expectations	are	
steady	( &πe = 0 )	or	if	expected	inflation	is	determined	by	the	hypothesis	of	perfect	foresight.	
Equation	(3.4)	can	then	be	written	as	















































































Fig. 3.1. The inflation tax Laffer curve
45
3.3. The effect of inflation on the real primary deficit  























	 &m = D π( )−m π( )π.	 (3.7)	
If	 the	 factors	 of	 the	 first	 group	 (i.e.	 the	Patinkin	 effect)	 have	 the	 greater	 impact,	 i.e.	
′D •( ) < 0 ,	 then	 the	budget	deficit	 curve	will	have	a	negative	 slope.	Fig.	3.2	 illustrates	 the	
simplest	case,	when	the	dependence	of	the	deficit	on	inflation	is	linear17.	Up	to	three	steady	























3.4. Basic model of the dynamics of public debt and inflation 
We	will	use	 the	 following	model	as	 the	basis	 for	 studying	 the	 interaction	of	 fiscal	and	
monetary	policies	in	both	this	and	later	chapters:
	
&b = d + rb−µm,

























the	following	specification	of	the	Olivera-Tanzi	effect	is	suggested:	 d = G − T 1+σπ( )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ ,	where	G	is	govern-




Fig. 3.2. Steady states in the inflation tax Laffer curve model for ′D •( ) < 0  
(the Patinkin effect)






















































































The	money	market	will	be	 in	a	steady	state	( &m	=	0)	 if	 the	rate	of	 inflation	is	equal	 to	
the	growth	rate	of	base	money:	π(m*)	=	π*	=	µ.	No	matter	what	the	situation	is	in	the	fiscal	
sphere,	there	is	a	unique	equilibrium	value	for	the	volume	of	real	money	balances	m*	for	every	
value	of	the	money	policy	parameter.	This	result	 is	depicted	by	the	horizontal	 line	MM	 in	
Fig.	3.4,	the	phase	diagram	for	system	(3.9).	






























states	in	the	fiscal	and	monetary	spheres	( &m 	=	0,	 &b 	=	0)	for	various	values	of	the	parameter	µ.	




















Fig. 3.5. The set of steady states of public debt and real money balances  








3.5. A model for the dynamics of public debt and inflation  













1− π m( )( )+ rb −µm,

























































, 0 <m <1.









































Fig. 3.7. The set of steady states of public debt and real money balances  




Fig. 3.8. The interconnection between public debt and the growth rate of base money  




Fig. 3.10. Interconnection between public debt and the growth rate of base money  
in the economy’s steady state for high values of the designed budget deficit
Fig. 3.9. The set of steady states of public debt and real money balances  
















	 D π( ) = d0 1+π m( )( )+ rb,	 (3.18)
we	will	see	that	just	as	in	the	inflation	tax	Laffer	curve	model,	our	modification	of	the	system	
(3.8)	does	not	qualitatively	change	its	properties.	The	set	of	steady	points	of	the	SS curve	for	





























, 0 <m <1.



















3.6. Analysis of bifurcations  
in the system of public debt and real money balances























&m = F (m,D), D = d + rb,



























,b) = rb + d
0











Fig. 3.11. The vector field for the model without inflation effects on the budget deficit


















































30 Here	we	 consider	 b	 as	 a	 parameter	 and	 analyze	 the	movement	 of	 the	 equilibrium	 point	 following	
changes	in	this	parameter.	See	technical	discussion	of	this	bifurcation	in	Azariadis	(1993,	p.	146—147).
59
Fig. 3.14. Bifurcation diagram (with respect to the parameter b) 
for the model with a negative influence of inflation on the budget deficit
Fig. 3.13. Vector field (with respect to the parameter b)  


























A	 deeper	 economic	 interpretation	 of	 these	 equilibrium	 processes	 for	 a	 transitional	
















(asymptotic)	 increase	 in	 the	 steady	 value	 of	 the	 growth	 rate	 of	 base	money	 (a	 decrease	
in	 the	 volume	 of	 demand	 for	 real	money	 balances)	 up	 to	 the	 level	 that	 corresponds	 to	
































Fig. 3.15. Bifurcation diagram (with respect to the parameter d0)  







Fig. 3.16. Bifurcation diagram (with respect to the parameter d0)  
for a high volume of public debt

















3.7. The Russian crisis of 1998  





























































Year 1995 1996 1997
Operational	deficit	(actual,	percent	of	GDP) 5.7 8.4 7.0
Operational	deficit	(target,	percent	of	GDP) 6.0 4.2 3.2
Primary	deficit	(actual,	percent	of	GDP) 2.2 2.5 2.4
Interest	payments	(percent	of	GDP) 3.6 5.9 4.6
Government	debt	(percent	of	GDP) 50 48 50
Government	debt	(billions	USD) 170 201 218
Seigniorage	(percent	of	GDP) 3.62 1.26 1.36
Real	GDP	growth	(percent	a	year) –4.0 –3.4 0.9
Inflation	rate	(percent	a	year) 131 22 11



































































































































At	the	same	time	even	a	significant	 increase	 in	the	designed	primary	deficit	 that	 is	 fi-
nanced	 without	 additional	 government	 borrowings,	 can	 have	 less	 severe	 implications	 for	
inflation.	Depending	on	 the	 initial	 state,	 the	economy	may	undergo	either	an	 increase	or	
a	decrease	 in	the	equilibrium	rate	of	 inflation;	however,	a	 further	 increase	 in	the	designed	



















time	utility	 from	consumption	 and	 real	money	balance.	 Including	 the	 latter	 in	 the	utility	





































	 &a = &m+ &b = y + rb − c − πm−T = y + ra− c − (r + π)m−T .	 (А3.4)	
to	the	version	used	in	Drazen	(1985).	A	canonical	representation	of	the	model	can	be	found,	for	example,	in	
Blanchard	and	Fischer	(1989),	Turnovsky	(2000),	Walsh	(1998).
























= &m+ πm .	The	budget	constraint	of	 the	government	 in	 terms	of	 real
variables	can	be	written	as	










u c,m( )e−ρt dt
0
∞
∫ s.t. &a = y + ra − c − (r + π)m−T ,	
we	write	the	Hamiltonian	function	



















λ(t)e−ρt⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ = −
∂H
∂a
, &λ = λ(ρ− r),	 (А3.10)
	 lim
t→∞

























	 u(c,m) = v(c)+w(m).	 (А3.13)	
For	this	functional	form,	the	first	order	condition	(A3.8)	can	be	written	as	










(m) = λ(r +π).	 (А3.15)	
In	addition,	a	constant	co-state	variable	allows	us	to	use	condition	(A3.10)	to	determine	
the	constant	level	of	the	real	interest	rate:




&b = rb + (G −T )− πm,
























lnm( ), α1,α2 > 0,	 (А3.18)	













and	 the	 real	 interest	 rate	are	determined	by	conditions	 (А3.7)	and	(А3.16),	which	do	not	









































Fiscal and monetary policy interaction I: 





























































































4.2. Stability of the backward-looking dynamics  
and macroeconomic policies 
Let	us	 return	 to	 the	basic	model	 for	 the	dynamics	of	public	debt	and	 real	money	ba-
lances:
	
&b = d + rb−µm,














































lance	and	public	debt	 far	 from	equilibrium	may	be	 somewhat	different.	However,	as	we	pointed	out	 in	 the	
previous	chapter,	the	presence	of	the	limiting	cycle	for	the	system	is	unlikely.	
76







	 b(t) = b∗ + (b
0














































= r − g

























































































	 &my = 0, π my

























	 by my( ) =
π m































Fig. 4.3. The connection between by and µ in the steady state of the economy if r < gy
yb
µ












4.3. Unilateral monetary policy
In	a	steady	state,	the	rate	of	inflation	is	equal	to	the	growth	rate	of	base	money.	However,	
as	shown	in	Section	2.3,	a	decrease	in	the	growth	rate	of	base	money	in	a	money	market	with	

























































10	 Analogously,	the	central	bank	can	bring	the	system	to	a	state	where	 &m > 0, &b < 0	for	the	trajectories	E0А,	
E0С	and	E0D.	However,	the	shape	of	the	SS	curve	and	the	relative	magnitudes	of	the	model’s	parameters	do	not	
always	guarantee	a	return	to	one	of	the	steady	states.	We	will	return	to	this	problem	later.
Fig. 4.4. The consequences of unilateral monetary policy actions  
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4.5. Anti-inflationary monetary policies that requires  
a decrease in the budget deficit
It	was	shown	above	 that	monetary	policy	 that	destabilizes	 the	economy	under	certain	













Fig. 4.5. The consequences of unilateral fiscal policy actions (a decrease in the steady volume  














monetary	policies13.	The	 initial	 increase	 in	 the	 rate	of	 increase	of	 the	money	base	 shifts	 the	
equilibrium	to	point	E1 (while	economy	keeps	staying	in	point	E0)	and	brings	about	an	increase	







4.6. Loose monetary policy and fiscal surpluses  
in Russia after the crisis, 2000—2003
A	year	after	 the	August	1998	crisis,	Russian	macroeconomic	policy	was	rethought.	As	
shown	in	Section	3.7,	the	period	before	the	crisis	was	characterized	by	a	tight	monetary	po-

































Table 4.1. Federal government operational budget surplus (percent of GDP), 2000—2003
3 months 6 months 9 months year
1997 –4.3 –4.3 –3.8 –3.3
1998 –3.5 –3.9 –3.0 –3.2
1999 –2.5 –2.5 –2.5 –1.5
2000 2.1 3.3 3.0 2.5
2001 2.6 3.3 2.7 2.9
2002 5.0 6.3 2.4 1.4
2003 3.1 5.9 6.5 1.7
                                    Source:	HSE	Economic	Journal,	Statistics	(various	issues).
In	the	fiscal	sphere,	the	turnover	in	fiscal	balance	led	to	a	rapid	decrease	in	the	value	of	
public	debt.	Figures	4.8	and	4.9	illustrate	this	point.	After	the	default,	internal	government	
debt	 (in	 form	of	 the	market	 instruments	GKO	and	OFZ)	was	quite	 low	and	more	or	 less	
stable.	At	the	same	time,	large	fiscal	surpluses	allowed	the	government	to	significantly	reduce	
its	external	debt.









Fig. 4.8. Internal debt in market instruments (GKO-OFZ) in Russia, 2000—2003
Source:	CBR;	HSE	Economic	Journal,	Statistics	(various	issues).




































































Why	 should	 this	 period	be	 considered?	 In	 fact,	 fiscal	 surpluses	were	positive	not	only	 for	
the	period	of	2000—2003,	but	 in	subsequent	years	as	well.	Nevertheless,	we	restricted	our	
example	 to	 this	period.	This	 is	due	 to	 the	extraordinary	events	 in	 the	 fiscal	and	monetary	
spheres	that	took	place	in	2004.	The	first	event	was	that,	starting	from	January	1,	2004	the	
Russian	Government	began	to	accumulate	the	Stabilization	Fund,	which	has	reached	more	
than	70	billion	US	dollars	by	 the	end	of	2006.	This	Fund	partly	 acts	 as	 a	mechanism	 for	
pumping	out	excess	liquidity	resulting	from	a	large	net	export	that,	in	its	turn,	stems	from	





































Second.	 Returning	 to	 Russia	 in	 2000—2003,	 one	 should	 not	 view	 this	 period	 as	 an	





























































































































































4.8. The policy of increasing the primary deficit  
































(while	economy	keeps	staying	in	point	E0).	The	economy	is	then	in	a	state	where	 &m > 0,
&b < 0 	
with	respect	to	the	new	steady	state.	However,	the	ensuing	dynamics	of	the	system	may	either	





4.9. Consequences of “unpleasant monetarist arithmetic” for fiscal policy
Using	the	results	of	Section	4.3,	we	can	consider	the	results	of	a	temporary	decrease	in	
the	growth	rate	of	base	money	using	assumptions	analogous	 to	 those	of	Sargent	and	Wal-
lace	 (1981).	 Initially,	when	 the	central	bank	decreases	 the	growth	rate	of	base	money,	 the	



































22	 The	points	F, H	and	I are	shown	to	lie	on	one	curve	in	Fig.	4.14	for	clarity.	This	is	possible	if	we	choose	
varying	time	intervals		[0,	T]	for	each	of	the	corresponding	trajectories.	





















4.10. Feasibility constraints on the interaction  



























































28	 Given	 the	assumptions	of	 the	model,	 the	central	bank	can	always	bring	 the	money	market	back	 to	
a	steady	state	by	setting	the	growth	rate	of	base	money.	










4.11. Summary and conclusions
The	conclusions	that	can	be	made	by	considering	this	model	are	based	on	the	assump-
tions	regarding	the	inertial	character	of	the	backward	looking	dynamics	of	the	money	market.	




the	economy	back	 into	equilibrium,	while	 the	government	 (if	 this	does	not	violate	 the	 li-
mitations	on	the	variables	of	fiscal	policy)	can	always	shift	the	volume	of	public	debt	from	
one	steady	state	to	another	without	changing	the	inflation	rate.	If	inflation	has	a	significant	



























































































	 b(m) = b∗ + b
0













































































































































µ+ rε ,	 (А4.4)
where,	 using	 the	 equality	 of	 steady	 inflation	 and	 growth	 rate	 of	 base	 money,	 we	 have


































In	 particular,	 for	 the	 Cagan	 demand	 function	 (2.11)	 with	 constant	 semi-elasticity,	
ε(µ)	=	–αµ,	we	have






















Fiscal and monetary policy interaction II:


















































tions	 5.2—5.10	we	 study	 several	 possible	ways	 in	which	 fiscal	 and	monetary	 policies	may	
interact.	 In	particular,	Sections	5.5,	5.7,	5.9	and	5.10	provide	historical	experience	of	 the	
United	States,	Latin	American	and	Asian	countries	that	serve	as	counterparts	to	theoretical	







In	Sections	5.11—5.13	we	consider	 the	consequences	of	uncertainty	about	 the	 timing	
and	type	of	changes	in	macroeconomic	policies.	In	Section	5.14	we	return	yet	again	to	the	





























&b = d + rb − μm,



















































b(t ) = E
t









money	balances.	The	Cagan	function	(2.11)	gives	us	 	 x = lnm = −απ,	and	this	allows	us	to	
automatically	arrive	at	the	equation	for	the	dynamics	of	inflation	(5.3).	Thus,	using	the	defi-









b(t )e − rt = 0.	In	the	general	case	fiscal	and	monetary


















5.3. A permanent increase  
in the growth rate of base money
It	 is	clear	 from	equations	(5.2)	and	(5.3)	 that	 the	expected	permanent	 increase	 in	the	
growth	rate	of	base	money	results	in	an	increase	in	inflation	and	a	decrease	in	real	money	


























































































































S (t ) =
μ
0









( tS − t )
, t
A
















Figure	 5.1	 shows	 the	 time	 paths	 of	 these	 variables.	 Prior	 to	 the	 announcement,	 the	
money	market	is	in	a	steady	state.	The	announcement	at	time	t	=	tA	leads	to	discrete	jumps	






































































value	 (evaluated	at	 time	 tA)	of	 future	 seigniorage	 revenues.	Assume	 for	 simplicity	 that	 the	
public	debt	is	initially	at	the	steady	state	for	some	constant	level	of	primary	budget	deficit.	If	
the	new	steady	state	level	of	seigniorage	for	t > tS	is	lower	than	it	was	initially	(for	t > tA),	then	
the	present	value	of	seigniorage	will	fall.	This	means	that	the	current	(predetermined)	level	
of	public	debt	 is	higher	 than	it	 should	be	assuming	a	sustainable	 fiscal	policy.	The	bottom	















Fig. 5.1. Dynamics of inflation, the log of real money balances, seigniorage, and the sustainable 



































































































Fig 5.2. Dynamics of inflation, the log of real money balances, seigniorage, and the sustainable 
































































led	to	an	escalation	 in	 inflation,	 the	deficits	 resulted	 in	a	dramatic	growth	of	 internal	and	
external	 public	 debt.	Before	 the	 oil-price	 shock	 and	 the	Yom	Kippur	War	 in	 1973,	 Israel	
was	in	its	“Golden	Age”	of	growth	that	was	11.2	percent	in	1950—1960	and	9.7	percent	in	
1961—1972	 (annually,	on	average).	Under	 these	conditions,	 large	 fiscal	deficits	 (although	























































































1978—1980 17,2 2,0 7,3 6,9
1981—1983 14,1 2,1 7,2 4,9
1984 12,7 2,9 0,2 5,3 4,4
1985 –0,6 5,8 –6,5 –3,9 4,0












































Fig. 5.4. Budget deficit in Chile, 1970—1988
Source:	International	Financial	Statistics,	IMF.
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Source:	International	Financial	Statistics,	IMF.
Fig. 5.6. Inflation and growth rate of base money in Mexico, 1982—1994
Source:	International	Financial	Statistics,	IMF.





























































































5.6. A temporary decrease  






































































































































































































































































S (t ) =
μ
0


























































































Fig. 5.8. Dynamics of inflation, the log of real money balances, seigniorage, and the sustainable 
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However,	 there	 is	another	possible	 scenario.	When	condition	(5.12)	 fails	 to	hold,	 real	





































5.7. Reaganomics II: A forward-looking interpretation
In	section	4.7	we	proposed	an	explanation	of	the	decrease	in	inflation	in	1982—1983	in	
the	U.S.	that	took	place	despite	a	substantial	ease	in	monetary	policy;	that	was	essentially	a	
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Fig. 5.10. Dynamics of inflation, the log of real money balances, seigniorage,  
and the sustainable level of public debt for a temporary increase in the growth rate  
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in	 expected	 future	 budget	 deficits,	 the	 sustainable	 level	 of	 public	 debt	 also	 increases	 at	
time	tA .
19	After	 that	 it	 increases	gradually	 for	 some	 time	and	 then	decreases.	Eventually	 it	















































Surprisingly,	 for	certain	values	of	 the	parameters	 it	 is	quite	possible	 to	keep	 the	pres-
































































































Fig. 5.11. Dynamics of inflation, the log of real money balances, seigniorage,  
and the sustainable level of public debt for a temporary decrease in the growth rate  
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Source:	International	Financial	Statistics,	IMF.
Fig. 5.12. Inflation and growth rate of money in Argentina, 1980—1992
Source:	World	Development	Indicators,	The	World	Bank	Group.


















































































5.9. Unpleasant monetarist arithmetic at work: 





















Primary deficit Interest payments Operational Deficit Seigniorage
1984
I 5,8 5,2 11,0 10,2
II 3,4 5,9 9,3 7,2
III 2,1 4,8 6,9 5,2




Primary deficit Interest payments Operational Deficit Seigniorage
1985
I 3,6 6,5 10,1 6,0
II 0,1 6,4 6,5 6,8
III -3,5 6,5 3,0 8,9
IV -4,8 6,8 2 4,1
1986
I –1,1 5,8 4,7 4,1
II –3,5 5,7 2,2 3,3
III –1,3 2,8 1,5 2,4
IV 3,0 5,7 8,7 3,1
1987
I 1,0 4,1 5,1 4,5
II 0,4 6,3 5,7 2,7
III 1,4 6,7 8,1 1,7
IV 1,6 4,3 5,9 5,0
1988
I 0,3 9,0 9,3 3,3
II –0,7 5,8 5,1 4,2
III 2,6 0,9 3,5 5,3

































5.10. The Asian crisis of 1997:  












Burnside,	Eichenbaum	and	Rebelo	 (2001)	consider	 the	 situation	 in	 the	period	before	














Fig. 5.14. Budget surplus (deficit) in selected countries, 1995—2005
Source:	International	Financial	Statistics,	IMF.	











































































































Fig. 5.16. Growth rate of money in selected countries, 1995—2005
Source:	International	Financial	Statistics,	IMF.	














































































































ability	 relies	on	 the	 specific	 assumptions	 that	we	 stressed	 in	Chapter	2:	 the	 interest	 rate	
























a GDP	growth1 8,4 7, 4,7 –13,1 0,8 4,9 3,8 4,4 4,7 5,1 5,6
Real	interest	
rate2





1 9,5 5,9 –1,4 –10,5 4,4 4,8 2,2 5,3 7,0 6,2 4,5
Real	interest	
rate2




GDP	growth1 9,2 7,0 4,7 –,9 9,5 8,5 3,8 7,0 3,1 4,7 4,0
Real	interest	
rate2











a GDP	growth1 9,8 10,0 7,3 -7,4 ,1 8,9 0,3 4,4 5,4 7,1 5,3
Real	interest	
rate2






s GDP	growth1 4,7 5,8 5,2 -0, 3,4 6,0 1,8 4,4 4,5 6,0 5,1
Real	interest	
rate2




5.11. Uncertainty about the magnitude and the direction of change  
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μ
0
















( tS − t )
, t
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⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ < μ1 ,	and	the	log	of	real	money	balances	(inflation)	is
decreasing	(increasing).	However,	its	path	(the	long-chain	line	in	Fig.	5.18)	is	above	(below)	













⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ < μ1,	the	log	of	real	money	balances	and	seig-
















rate	of	base	money	results	 in	a	discrete	 fall	 in	bS 	at	 time	 tA	 (the	solid	 line	 in	Fig.	5.18),	 if	







Fig. 5.18. Dynamics of inflation, the log of real money balances, seigniorage,  
and the sustainable level of public debt for the case of a permanent increase in growth rate  

















downward	 jump	in	bS	 should	be	even	 larger	(the	chain	 line	 in	Fig.	5.18).	The	government	


















































































Fig. 5.19. Discrete change in the sustainable level of public debt  
as a function of the future growth rate of base money given a low interest rate
Fig. 5.20. Discrete change in the sustainable level of public debt  























































































































































































































































































































































S (t ) =
μ
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( )	 the	 dynamics	 of	 all	 variables	will	 be	 smoothened.	How-




































Fig. 5.21. Dynamics of inflation, the log of real money balances, and seigniorage  
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Fig. 5.22. Dynamics of inflation, the log of real money balances, and seigniorage  
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the	possibility	of	 increasing	 the	present	value	of	 future	volumes	of	 seigniorage	 is	bounded	
from	above	as	well.	In	the	steady	state,	the	maximum	volume	of	seigniorage	coincides	with	









by	the	maximum	of	 the	 inflation	tax	curve,	 is	possible	only	at	 the	expense	of	a	 temporary	
positive	value	of	pure	seigniorage,	
 	 &m > 0 ,	in	other	words	at	the	expense	of	a	decrease	in	infla-
tion	expectations.	However,	the	increase	in	real	money	balances	cannot	be	infinitely	large.
5.15. Conclusion: the role of expectations and of economic regimes 


























































































































t	=	0 0.05 –0.5 0.03 2.033 0.203














t	=	0 0.07 –0.7 0.035 2.476 0.248
























t	=	0 0.05 –0.5 0.03 2.033 0.203







































t	=	0 0.05 –0.5 0.03 2.033 0.203






































t	=	0 0.09 –0.09 0.037 2.659 0.266


















































Is inflation a completely monetary phenomenon?	No,	 far	 from	 it.	 In	many	 cases	 (in	
particular,	 in	countries	with	undeveloped	 financial	markets)	 seigniorage	may	be	an	
important	source	for	the	financing	of	the	budget	deficit.	In	this	case	inflation	will	have	
fiscal	causes.










depends	on	 the	economic	 institution.	Second	of	all,	depending	on	 the	elasticity	of	
demand	for	real	money	balances	with	respect	to	inflation	expectations,	equilibriums	
with	both	low	and	high	inflation	may	be	stable	for	a	given	level	of	the	budget	deficit.	









and	 sometimes	 increase	 the	budget	deficit	 in	 response	 to	a	 tightening	of	monetary	
policy.	
Can chronic inflation be overcome only by a tight monetary policy that is formally in-







































Should an increase in the government budget deficit be accompanied by an increase or 






What situations are there in which neither fiscal nor monetary policies are able to avoid 




is	 bounded	 from	 above	 and	 the	 volume	of	 state	 expenditures	 is	 bounded	 from	be-
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